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1 Introduction
In Arrow ( 1963) the voting problem (also called collective choice problem) was formalized 
in a framework where the following (first) model was presented: The individual opinions 
were described in terms of binary relations and the collective choice was described in 
terms of choice function. 
A. Sen ( 1970) focused on the fact that this problem, conld be reinterpreted as the 
problem of the aggregation of binary relations. Indeed, in this first model, the choice 
functions mentioned above are using the information on the pairs of options ( in the 
terminology used in Aizerman and Aleskerov ( 1990) , these choice functions are pair­
dominant) That is why, this first model with the collective choice presented as a choice 
function is  equivalent to the same problem but where the collective decision is presented as 
a collective binary relation. This first model was studied in many other papers, the most 
wide investigation made in  Ferejohn and Fishburn ( 1 977) and Aleskerov and Vladimirov 
( 1986)' 
In Aleskerov ( 1 984) and Aizerman and Aleskerov ( 1 986) ,  the collective choice problem 
was presented in the framework of another (second) model where both the individual 
opinions and the collective choice were given in terms of choice functions. 
The third model, where.the individual opinions .are.given in.terms of binary relations 
and the collective choice is expressed as a (non-binary) choice function, was studied by 
few papers ( see, e.g., Blair et al. ( 1 976), Aleskerov ( 1984) ,  ( 1985) ,  ( 1 991 ) ). 
*This article was finished during the author's visit to the Division of the Humanities and Social 
Sciences at the California Institute of Technology. Partial financial support was received from the Caltech 
Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science. I would like to express my gratitude to 
the faculty and members of the Division who made my visit here pleasant and fruitful. I also thank to 
Kenneth Arrow, Richard McKelvey, Peter Ordeshook, and Charles Plott for their helpful comments. 
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Before we turn to the analysis of this third model let us mention that the operators 
which transform individual binary relations to the collective one are picked out in  Arrow 
( 1963) by the condition of the independence of irrelevant alternatives. The analogous 
condition in  Aleskerov and Vladimirov (1986) was called as quasi-locality one and m 
Aizerman and Aleskerov ( 1986) under the other framework - the locality one. 
Further, those operators were restricted by some other obvious and natural conditions 
and limitations which lead to find the explicit form of .those.operators such as dictator­
ship (when the collective decision coincides with the individual opinion of some voter), 
oligarchy (when the collective decision coincides with the unanimous opinion of selected 
group of voters), etc. 
In Blair et al. ( 1976) the condition of locality for the third model was formalized in 
a very general form and lead to few concrete results and the dictatorship operators were 
obtained under very strong and nonobvious additional restrictions. 
This paper deals with the voting problem in the framework of the third model which 
is introduced in the section 2. The locality condition is given in the section 3 as well 
as the list-form representation of local operators - the special language which is used to 
prove a.II theorems. In section 4 some normative conditions of operators a.re given and the
section 5 will introduce them in terms of list-form representation of operators. In section 
6 explicit form of local operators are given for a special class called Central Region. In 
section 7 the special cases of opera.tors introduced in the previous section are studied. 
In section 8 range constraints on the operators from Central Region are investigated, 
these constraints being given as characteristic conditions on choice functions. In sections
9 and IO the operators from Symmetrically Central Region a.re considered, the explicit
form of these opera.tors is given. In section 1 1  the ma.in theorem is given showing the 
closedness of domains in the space of choice functions relative to operators from Central 
and Symmetrically Central Regions. 
2 Framework 
The following problem will be studied: Let us consider the set. A ( IAI = m :::: 2) of options 
and the set N ( INI = n :::: 2 )  of individuals. The options will be denoted by letters such 
that a, b, X1o x ' ·---and the voters will be .denoted .by . .their . .indices 1,..2, ... . , n.
Each voter i E N is independent from the other voters and expresses his/her opinion
on the options with the binary relation G;. A binary relation can also be interpreted 
in terms of preference relation. In this case, the pair (a, b) is in G; if "the option a is
preferred to the option b" . 
2 
For simplicity, the binary relation G;, i = 1 ,  . . . , n is assumed to satisfy the following
conditions: 
1. irrefiexivity: Va E A,
2. transitivity: Va, b E A,
(a,a) 1$ G;; 
(a, b) E G; (b, c) E G; ===> (a, c) E G;;
3. negative transitivity: Va, b E A, (a,b) f$G; (b, c) f$ G; ===> {a,c)fjG;. 
Such a binary relation is called a weak order. It admits the obvious following interpreta­
tion: for any pair of options, it is possible to establish their equity or the fact that one 
option is more preferable than the other. 
Hereafter we consider that individual binary relations are weak orders. The totality 
of all weak orders is denoted by W. G will be hereafter denoted the profile { G1, ... , Gn} 
of weak orders on the totality of voters. 
Now let us add the condition of linearity: Va, b EA (a, b) E G; or (b, a) E G; to
the previous 1),2), and 3 )  conditions. In this case the weak order is called a linear order,1 
which means that for each pair of options in G; it is possible to establish that one option
is more preferable than the other. 
Now we introduce the "dominant set" for the option ,, which will be very useful 
further. 
Definition 1 The dominant set D( 2: ) for the option x in the binary relation G is defined
as follows: 
D(.c) = {yEA I (y,x) EG }, 
1.e. the dominant set for :r is a set of all options which are more preferable than x. 
Vie define now the choice function with which the collective decision is presented. Let
us note that we study the collective choice problem not only on the whole set A but also
on subsets from A named X.
Let A0 be the set o'f all non-empty subsets of A. The choice'Y on the set X satisfies
to the condition Y c;; X. The set of pairs { (X, Y) }  for all X defines the choice function
Y = C(X). 
The totality of all choice functions on A is called the space of choice functions and is 
denoted by C. 
1Strictly speaking, linear order can be defined by conditions 1), 2) and the condition of linearity. 
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Further we will not restrict somehow the set C, i .e . all choice functions are admissible 
as a collective decision. Thus, the voting operator, also simply called operator, transforms
one profile { G;} in a choice function C(. ) ; or strictly speaking transforms the domain
defined by the n-tuple Cartesian product wn = W X . . .  X W in the space C.
These operators will be called relational-functional voting operators. 
3 Locality Condition
There are many operators which implement the mapping wn ---> C. This is too wide
space and the operators will be studied which are satisfying to a special locality condition. 
Definition 2 The operator F : wn ---> C will be called a local one if it satisfies to
the following condition: Let two profiles G, G' are given and suppose that for some x, X, 
x EXE A0 the following equality Vi E N  Xn"D;(1:) = Xn"Di(x) holds which means
that the dominant sets for the option x in X in the relations G; and Gi coincide. Then 
x E C(X) if and only if.TE C'(X) where C(.) = F(G) and C'(.) = F(G'). 
This condition in a more general form was introduced in Aleskerov ( 1985). 
On Figure 1 are drawn two profiles G and G' ( linear orders under graph form) on 
the set A = {a, b, c, d} and N = { 1 ,  2, 3}. It can be easily seen that for the subset 
X = {a, b, c} the dominant sets for option c coincide for all binary relations G;, i = 
], 2, 3. Let us note, however, that for the relations G1 and G1' the dominant sets are such 
that °D1(c) n X = °D;(c) n X = {a.b} but for the option b instead of C, °D1(b) n X = 0
and "D;(b) n X ={a}. Thus the locality condition is satisfied if c is included (or not 
included) in C(X) and also if c is included (respectively not included) in C'(X). Below, 
two examples of relational-functional operators are given. 
Example 1 Let u.s consider the Pareto rule This rule will be denoted by FPar· For all
x, X such that x E X E A0 the following definition of this rule will be considered: 
x E C(X) � (:ly EX: Vi EN yG;x)
It means that x is included in the choice C ( X) if and only if another option y is not 
preferred to x in all relations G;. 
It can be proved that the operator FPar satisfies to the condition of locality. 
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Example 2 Let us consider now another operator which will be called Borda2 operator 
and denoted by FBorda: Let us present a binary relation as a graph and let for each option 
a in binary relation G; r;( a) is the number of arcs going from corresponding vertex. 
As a rule of aggregation, we consider the rule which includes in the collective choice 
those options which have maximum sum value I: r;(a). This rule can be written in the 
iEN 
following form: 
x E C(X) � (x EX I x= arg max L r;(a)). 
aEX iEN 
Let us consider now two profiles G and G' shown in Figure 2 and the set A = { x, y, z} , 
the set N = {l, 2,  3}, the alternative a:. Let us note that Vi EN 'D;(x) n A= v;(x) n A 
and according to condition of locality,,. is included (or is not included) in choice C(A) 
if and only if x belongs (or does not belong) to C'(A). Let us consider now the rule
introduced above for profile G. One can see that I: r;(i:) = I: r;(y) = I: r;(z) = 3 
and hence C(A) =A. 
iE1V iEN iEN 
However, in the profile G', I: r;(x) = 3, but I: r;(y) = 2 and I: r;(z) = 4 and thus
iEN iEN iEN 
z E C'(A) and x Ff_ C'(A). 
According to this example the operator Fsorda is not local. 
Now let us introduce a new language for the study of relational-functional operators. 
The totality of sets { Z}: where Z = ( Z1, . . •  , Zn) and Vi E N Z; <;;; X\ { x} is called list
for the pair (x, X), ,T E )( E A0• The list for the pair (x, X) will be denoted O(x, X): 
O(x,X) = {Z}:. 
The relational-functional operator Funder list-form representation is  defined by OF = 
{O(x,X)} and the rule:
xEC(X)�(:IZ: Z=(Z1 ..... Zn)E0(.1·,X)EOF and 'ifiEN Xn'D;(x)=Z;) 
( 1 )  
Theorem 1 Each local relational-functional operator has a list-form representation. Each
relational-functional operator which admits the list-form representation is a local opera­
io1'. 
2This operator is analogues to that studied in Borda ( 1781 ) . His work was one of the first in which
voting problem wa.s stated formally. 
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Proof: Let us consider the whole set of profiles on weak orders G and arbitrary set
X E A0 and the option x E X. Construct a list for local operator F according to
the following algorithm. For a given profile G, if x E C(X), let us include the set
Z = (Z1, • . .  , Zn) where each component is Vi E N Z; = "D;(x) n X, as an element in
the list f!(x,X). All such lists f!(x, X) define the whole list f!F for the operator F.
Making use of this list and the rule (1) defines some operator F. Let us show that
F = F. The functions generated by the operators F and F will be denoted as C(.)
and C(  · ) respectively. Consider the profile G and assume that there exist X and x such
that x E C(X) and x f/: C(X). Becau'e of the fact that x E C(X), according to the
construction of the operator Fit means that there exist a profile G' s.t. xn"D;(x) = Z;
for all i. Because of the pre-assumption that F is local, the condition Vi "D; (x) n X = 
v; (x) n X and x E C'(X ) imply that :r E C(X).
Let now operator F has a list-form representation f!F and prove its locality. Let us 
consider two profiles G and G' such that Vi E N "D;(x) n X = 'IY,(x) n X . Then
if {"D;(x) n X} E f!F(x, X) then "' E C(X )  and "' E C'(X). On the other hand, if 
Vi E N {"D;("') n X} f/: f!F(1·,X) then .r f/: C (X) and"' f/: C'(X). The theorem is
proved. Q.E.D. 
4 Characteristic Conditions on Local Operators
Let us introduce now the characteristic conditions which a.re added to the condition of 
locality. 
1 ° .  Sovereignly. This condition consists of two conditions. 
l'j. Positive Sove1·eignty. For a.ll 1:. X ( » E X E A0) it exists a. profile G such that
,. E C(X) .  
1".. Negative Sovereignty. For all .r. X (.1· E X E A0) i t  exists a. profile G such that
"' >/. C(X).
In other words, while creating the function C(.), operator F takes into consideration
the individual opinions: t.herc are no x, X.for .. whi.cb. ... the . .caudit.iou that l'. is always in
C(X )  or x is never in C(X) had been fixed in a.dva.nce (independently of profile) .
2°. Monotonicity. Let us consider some profile G. a.nd for some x and X, (x EX E
A0) 'D;(x ) n X for a.ll i in:\'. Let 11011· in the profile C7': Vi EN v;("') n Xi;;; 'D;(.r) n X
holds. Then, x E C'(X) = .r E C'(X). 
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Let us explain this condition. On the figure 1 for the profile G, 'D1(d) n A= {a, b, c}, 
'D2(d) n A= 0 and 'D3(d) n A =  {a, c} and for the profile G' 1Y,(d) n A =  {a, b},
'IY.i(d) n A= 0 and 7Ys(d) n A= {a, c}. In these two profiles 'D2(d) n A and 'IY.i(d) n A 
coincide, this is also the case for 'D3( d) n A and 'D�( d) nA. However, for G1, the dominant 
set of d consists of a, b, c and for G; it consists of a, b. It can be interpreted in terms of 
preference relations: the set of preferred options for d in G; is narrower than in relation 
G1. So if dis in C(A) (collective choice) with profile G then dis to be in C'(A) with the
profile G'. 
It is obvious that the condition of monotonicity is a reinforcement of the condition of 
locality, i.e. the monotonic operator is local 
This condition of monotonicity were used in other terms by Muller and Satterthwaite 
(1977), Moulin and Peleg (1982), and Maskin (1986) 
3°. Ne1tirality to options. This condition is divided in two conditions: 
3�. Independence of options (of"' ) . Let for some x and y in X Vi X nD;(x) =
X n 'D;(y) .  Then y E C(X) iff x E C'(X).
3&. Independence of context ( of the subset X ) . Let us consider two subsets X and
X' of A0 with the condition Vi 'D;(x) n X = 'D;(x) n X'. Then x E C(X) if and only if 
x E C(X'). 
Conditions 3� and :3g are also a reinforcement of locality condition: put x = y or
X'=X. 
4°. Anonymity. Let 1) : N = N is a one-to-one mapping from the set N to N .
Then C( . )  = C'(.J where C( . )  = F(G1, ... , Gn) and C'( . )  = F(Gn(Ib .. ., Gn(n))· 
5°. Non-dominance. This condition is divided in the two following conditions: 
5�. Positive non-dominance. For all·"· X ( :r EXE A0), if it exists i0 EN such that
'Dio(x) n X = 0, then.TE C'(X). 
5"..  Negative non-domfrwnce. For all x, X (1• E X E A0) , if Vi E N 'D;(x) n X # 0,
then x tj C(X). 
6°. Unanimity. It for some x,X, (x EXE A0), and for all i EN 'D;(x) n X = 0, 
then x E C(X). 
Let us consider the operator Pareto and check to what conditions it satisfies. The 
satisfaction to the condition l 0 of non-i1nposedness is obvious. Show that this operator 
satisfies to the condition 2° of monotonicity. Actually, let us consider two profiles G and
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G'; let us put that for subset X and x EX it exists no y such that Vi EN y E 1\(x)nX
and then x E C(X). Now let us put that Vi EN D;(x) n X <;;; D;(x) n X and it exists
i0 such that D;Jx) n X C V;0(x) n X. But then obviously (I (D;(x) n X) = 0 again,
and according to the Pareto rule, x E C(X). It can be shown the satisfaction to the
conditions 3° and 4°. The conditions+ , 6° and can be shown obviously. Then, in order
to summarize, the operator Pareto satisfies to 1 ° n 2° n 3° n 4 ° n s+ n 6°.
Let us introduce some special operators which will be useful further. 
Definition 3 The "trivial operators" 0 and 1 are defined as follows:
Trivial operator 0: V)( E A
Trivial opera/01' 1 :  VX E A
C(X) = 0. 
C(X) = X. 
The operator "unanimity" is denoted "U" a:nd defined as follows:
U:C(X)={xEX\ViEN XnD;(x)=0}. 
The operator "at least one vote" is denoted "V" and defined a.s follows: 
v: C(X) = {x Ex I :lio EN Dd2:) n x = 0} 
Let us note that the trivial operator o satisfies to the conditions l'.'.. n 2° n 3° n 4° n 5'.'..,
the trivial operator 1 satisfies to the conditions i+ n 2° n 3° n 4° n s+ . The operator
unanimity u satisfies to 1° n 2° n :3° n 4° n 5° n 6° and finally the operator "at least one
vote" v satisfies to the conditions 1° n 2° n 3° n 4° n s+ n 5'.'._.
5 Characteristic Conditions of Operators in Terms
of List-form Representation 
The reformulation of the characteristic conditions on local opera.tors, introduced in pre­
vious section in terms of list-form representation and the prove of their equivalency is 
given below. 
1°. Sovereignty. This condition consists of ·two i:om:litions.
i+ Positive sovereignty. For all :r, X (x EXE A0) !l(x, X) # 0.
In order to formalize the condition of negative non-imposedness it is necessary to 
define T(x, X) as the list which contains all possible Z. 
l'.'._ Negative Sovereignty. For all x, X (x EXE A0) !l(x, X) # T(x, X) . 
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2°. Monotonicity 
Let us consider some profile G, and for some x and X, (x E X E A0) Z = 
(Z1, ... , Zn) E !1(x, X) and Z' such that: 'efi EN Zf � Z;. Then Z' E !1(x, X). 
3°. Neutrality to options. !1(x, X) = !1. This condition is divided in two conditions:
3�. Independence of options (of x). !1(x,X) = !1(X). 
3b'. Independence of context ( of the subset X) !1(x,X) = !1(x). 
4°. Anonymity. Let '7: N ==? N is a. one-to-one mapping and Z E !1(x,X). Then
'l·Z E !1(x, X) where 'l·Z = (Zn(lb ... , Zn(nil·
5°. Non-dominance. This condition is divided in the two following conditions:
5'j_. Positive non-dominance. For a.II Z = (Z1, • • .  ,.Zn) where one of its component
Z;0 is such that Z;0 = 0 Z E !1( x, X) holds.
5'.'..  Negative non-dominance. For all Z = (Z1, ... , Zn) s.t. 'efi E N Z; i= 0 Z l;j 
!1(x,X). 
6°. Unanimity. (0, ... , 0) belongs to !1(.T, X). 
Let us study now using list form representation how the classes of operators isolated 
by the conditions introduced above are related. 
Theorem 2 The following relation., between the conditions l'.'.., . .. , 6° hold: 5'j_ =} l'j_; 
5'.'.. =} l '.'.. ,. 6° =} i +,. .s+ =} 6° .. T: n :3° =} o .. T� n :3° =} i: T: n 3° =} 2°,. T� n 3° =} 
2° . T0 n 3° =} 5° ; T° n 3° =} 6°; T0 n =} :)0 : T° n T° n :3° = 0. 5° n 2° n 3° =} 5° .J - +, - ' + - ' - + ' - +1 
5� n 2° n 3° =;. 6°: T� n 3° =;. 4 °: T: n 3° =;. ,! 0; T: n 3° =;. 6°; T: n 3° =;. 5:.
Proof: It follows from the definitions of corresponding conditions. As an example we
prove here only one correlation 5� n 2° n :3° =;. 6°. Since 3° holds, then !1(x,X) = !1
for a.II x and X, and because of 5�, !1 contains one Z = (Z1,. • ., Zn) s.t. 'efj = 1,. . . ,  n 
Z1 i= 0, and . .monoti:micity-implies that Z'= (0, . . . �0)-wi!J-helong.to !1. Q.E.D.
The class of operators satisfying respectively to the conditions of a) sovereignty, b)
monotonicity, c) neutrality to options, cl) anonymity will be denoted as a)  A5, b) AM, c)
AN,d)f..A_ 
Two special classes in the space (set) L of all local operators are of a. special interest:
that one which isolated by conditions of sovereignty, monotonicity, and neutrality to 
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options - this class will be denoted as A SM N and will be called as Central Region in £; 
and the other one which isolated inside the Central Region by Anonymity condition -
the latter one will be denoted as ASMNA and called as Symmetrically-Central Region
in £. The operators from Symmetrically-Central Region A SMN A satisfy the conditions
which considered as necessary for each voting system. 
6 Explicit Form of Local Operators
Several operators in explicit form are introduced below. Using the words the "explicit 
form" means some explicitly given rule (or a.lgorithm) which allows to construct the 
collective choice function C(.) according to the given profile { G1, . • •  , Gn} of weak orders.
Let us note that the operators 0, 1, U and V a.re the examples of operators given in
an explicit form. 
Because the variety of the operators which satisfy to the conditions introduced above 
is very large, we first introduce some particular cases of operators in an explicit form and 
then give their generalization. Consider now the following operator: 
Fn(N,O): Vx,X "' E C(X) ¢>I n (Xn'Di(x) ) I  = 0,
iEN 
so x belongs to the collective choice C(X) iff the number of options which are more
preferable than x in each Gi is null, or otherwise speaking there is no option y which
is more preferable than "' for each voter. One can see that this operator is exactly the 
operator FPac introduced.above, i.e. FPa•· = F(N,O). 
The following genera.lization of this operator ca.n be defined not for all set N but for 
some coalition I C N and will be denoted by Fn(J, 0), i.e. choosing option in Pareto­
optimal for some coa.lition I. This can be ca.lied as partia.l Pareto operator. 
Let now the totality I of coalitions be given. and define the following two operators 
a) n Fn(I,O) and b) U Fn(I,O).
IET IET 
In case of a) choosing option has to be Pareto-optima.I for all coalitions from I; if I 
contains all single-element coalitions then the choosing option can be called as Cournot­
optima] one, if I contains all non-empty coalitions then e: can be called as Edgeworth­
optimal option. 
In case of b) the choosing option has to be Pareto-optimal in at least one coalition I
from I. 
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Generalizing these definitions let us introduce the following operator 
Fn(I,l) : J: E C(X) ¢} I n (XnD,(x)) ! "5. l,
iE/ 
i .e. the option x is chosen even if  there are qi options which are more preferable than x 
for every number of coalition I .  
This operator can be called as partial q-Pareto one. Analogously we can introduce a 
partial q-Pareto operator for a totality of coalitions and a partial q-Pareto one for at least 
one coalition i n  I. The option chosen by operator Fn(/, q1) will be called as q-Pareto
optimal in I .  
Consider now some other operator 
Fu(N, o) : .T E C(X) ¢}I U (xnvi(x) ) I  = o,
iEJ\' 
i.e. x i s  chosen if there is no some y which is  preferred to x at least by one voter from N.
One can see that by this opera.tor the Condorcet winner is  defined, so this operator will 
be called as Condorcet operator. Partial Condorcet operator will be defined as Fu( J, 0) 
where J E 2N \ {0} is  some non-empty coalition from N. 
Again we can define partial Condorcet opera.tor for a totality of coalitions J as 
n Fu(J, 0), and partial Condorcet operator for at least one coalition Jin :r, i .e. U TEJ JEJ 
Fu(J, 0) .  
The following generalization is  important: we introduce the partial p-Condorcet op­
erator, i .e. 
Fu(J,z/): x E C(X) ¢} I  u (XnDi(x) ) I  "5. pJ ,
iEJ 
i .e. x is chosen if there are no more than pJ options which are preferred to x at least by
one voter from J.  The option chosen by opera.tor Fu( J, qJ) will be called as q-Condorcet 
winner in J.  
Analogously we introduce the operators partial p-Condorcet for a totality of coalitions 
n Fu( J, pJ) and partial p-Condorcet opera.tor for at least one coalition from :1, i .e.
J EJ 
U Fu (J, pJ) .
JEJ 
Consider now one special form of combination of these operators, namely Fu( J, pJ) n Fn(J, q1) .
The option choosing by this operator has to be ·'p-Condorcet winner" in  coalition J and 
q-Pareto-optimal in coalition 1. 
1 1  
Let us note now that if in the definition of the operator Fn(I, q1) the number q1 is
greater or equal than I AI - 1, then by this operator the trivial one, namely 1, is defined.
If we redefine this operator for the case when q1 < 0, then the other trivial operator
0 will be obtained. The analogous situation takes place for the operator Fu(J,pJ) , so
hereafter we restrict these values by 0 < pJ,ql < m - 1, where m = I AI .  
Let us mention finally that if in the definition of operator Fu( J, pJ) the coalition J 
contains only one element i, then this operator will be denoted as F(i, qi], .and according
to this operator the option x is chosen if there are no more than p options which are
better than x in the weak order G;. Analogous situation takes place for operator Fn( I, q 1)
if III = 1.
These operators are local and satisfy additionally to the conditions of sovereignty (if 
0 < p, q < m - 1), monotonicity, neutrality, and positive non-dominance, which can be
checked directly. So these operators belongs to the Central Region ASMN. Varying the
numbers p and q in the definition of these operators one can obtain the class of operators,
depending of p and q, i .e .  p, q are parameters in the definition of these classes.3
The importance of the operators introduced above are explicated in the following. 
Theorem 3 The operator F belongs to the Central Region A CR iff there exist S 2: 0,
two sets of totalities of coalitions {Idl and {Jr};. the numbers {pi}JE.7, and {qJ}ra,,
s.t. VJ 0 <pf< m - 1, VJ 0 < q{ < m - 1 and
F= u 
[ = 1
[( n Fu(J,pf)) n( n Fn(J,qf) ) ] (2) 
Proof: Let F belong to the Central Region, this means that F can be represented in
list-form f! = {Zi}l, where Z, = (Zf, ... ,Z�), Zf i;; A, i = l, . .  . , n .
Consider in sequence according to each Z E: f! the following operators and define
Vi E: N F( i ,q;) = F(i,IZ;(); then for all I =  {i,k} define
Le. 
VI, I II >  1. Fu(I,1/) = Fu(!, I U Z,I ) ,  iEl 
Fn(J.c/) = Fn(J. I n Z;I ) ,iE/ 
3The correlation between these classes of opera.tors \Vere studied by Arnaud Taddei in his diploma at
the Institute of Control Sciences in 1992. 
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Construct the following operator 
F= 
u [( n F(i,q;)) n ( n Fu(I,p1)) nZEO iEN 1E2N\{0) 
n ( n Fn(I, q�))] ·1E2N\{0} 
(3) 
Let C(·) denote collective choice function corresponding to the operator F, and C(-)
denote the choice function generating by F, where F is the operator in the form (3).
Show that C(·) = C(-). Let x E C(x), then x E C(x). Suppose on the contrary that
x � C(x ). Q.E.D.
Lemma 1 Let fl be a list-foi'm for some operator F E A CR and Z E fl. Then the set
Z' = (z1n B1, ... ,znn Bn), where B; <;;; A, i = l, . . . ,n, belongs to fl.
Proof: It can be obtained immediately from the monotonicity of F . Q.E.D. 
Lemma 2 Let F1 and F2 be some operators from the Central Region A0R and fl1 and 
fl2 are their list-forms. Then the list form fl of operator F = F1 LJ F2 is just a union of 
Proof: It follows immediately from the definition of the list-form representation. Q.E.D. 
Lemma 3 Let F1 and F2 be somf operators from A CR and fl1 and fl2 are their list-forms. 
Then the list-form fl of operator F = F1 n F2 is equal to fl = { ZI z = Z; n Z1' Z; E 
fl1, z1 E n2, zi n z1 = ( z; n z;, ... , z� n z�)} 
Proof: Let Z1 E fl1 and Z2 E fl2' then according to Lemma 1, the set z = Z1 n Z2 
belongs both to fl1 and fl2. Now x E Fi(X. G) n F2(X, G) iff there exist Z1 E fl1 and
Z2 E fl2 s.t. Vi x n r>;(x) = Zl E Z1 and x n r>;(l'.) = Zl E Z2, i .e. Zl = Zl for all i, 
which implies ·z; = Z2• This equality holds only for such element Z of f!1 and f!2 which
can be represented in the form z = Z1 n Z2, Z1 E fl1, Z2 E fl2. Q.E.D.
Lemma 4 For an arbitrary operator Fu(!, pl) constructed according to some Z = (Z1, . . .  , Zn)
from fl in fl� there el'.ist Z' snch that Vi EI Z; = LJ Z1, Vi EN\ I Z; =A\ {x }, wherejEI 
fl� is the list form for the operator Fu(J, qr). 
Proof: Just because of definition of operator Fu(l,p1) the list-form representation for
this operator has to contain Vi EN \ I the set ziu =A\ {x }, and because of neutrality
in different zu all sets Z� = A \  { x} for all x E A. According to the construction of this
operator for all i E I Z;u = LJ Zj, where Z;u is the element in zu, and Zj are elements of
jEl 
Z according to which the operator Fu(I,p1) has been constructed. Q.E.D. 
Lemma 5 Let the operator Fn(I, q�) is constructed according to some Z = (Z1, • • •  ,-Zn) 
from fl. Then in fl7 there exist some Z' such that Vi E I z; = Z;, Vi E N\I Z[ = A\ { x}, 
where fl7 is a list form for Fn(I, q�). 
Proof: Analogous to the proof of Lemma 10. Q.E.D. 
Lemma 6 Let fl' be a list-form of operator F(i, q.;) constructed according to some Z =
( Z1' ... 'Zn) from fl. Then there e:rist Z' E fl' such that z; = z, and Vj # i Zj = A\ { x}.
Proof: Analogous to the proof of Lemma 10 .  
Let Z E fl. Show that Z E fl, where fl is  a list-form for the operator F. Consider
some Z; E Z. According to Lemmas 4-6 for each conponent of F contains Z' such that
Vi z; ;;;:> Z;, and there exist at least one component Z" such that Vi z;' ;;;:> Z; and for i0 
z:: = zio· Hence according to Lemma :3 fl contains z in which Z;o = Z;, i.e. x E C(X).
Let now x rj_ C(X) and 1· E C()\°). 
Because p E A CR' then p has a list-form representation fl = { zj }f' and the fact that
x E C(X), and x rf_ C(X) means that there exist Z1 and Zj such that Vi# i0 Z; = Z;,
z, E Zj, Z; E Zj, and Z;o # zio·
Consider the following cases: a) Z;o:) Z,,,: b) Z;o c Z;o; c) z,onzio # 0, Z;o CZ Z;o,
Z;o £ Z; o ; c) Z; o n .Z,o = 0.
In the case a) according to monotonicity of F if Z E fl and Z = (Z1, ... , Zn) with
Z;0, then Z' with Z;0 also belongs to fl and hence"' E C(X). 
In the case b) we obtain the contradiction with the construction of F, because
F(i0, jZ;0j) can not be the component in the definition of F. 
In the case c) let us consider without loss of generalitv the following situation z,_ = 
{a,c} and Z;0 =
1
{b,c}. Consider other Z;, and tl�e following two cases
� --
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c1 ) Vi# io Z; = 0. Then because of neutrality there exist z; s.t. Zj = (0, ... ' z,0,0, . . .  ,0) 
and x E C(X),x E C(X). 
c2) There exist Z;, i # io, s.t. z, # 0, then C2-1 ) Z; n z,o = 0 or Z; n z,o '} a, or
C2-2) Z; n z,o 3 a. The case C2 - 1 ) is admissible because of neutrality : with trans­
formation /(a) = b we obtain the set Zj which belongs to fl; the case C2-2) is 
not: it contradicts to the construction of the operator Fu( { i, i0}, p{i,i0l), because
p{i,io) = IZ; U Zd. The last case d) can be reduced to the case c) . It is obvious
that the operator F given in the form (3) can be reduced to the form (2).
The theorem is completely proved. Q. E.D. 
1 Explicit Form of Operators with Extremal Values
of Parameter q 
Let us investigate the introduced operators with values of parameter q equal to 0, m - 1
and q < 0. 
The following relations are obviously holding: Vi, I 
F (i,m- 1 )  = Fu(I. m - 1 )  = Fn(I , m - 1) = 1 
Additionally we can redefine these operators for the case when q is less than 0: 
'efi,I and q < 0 F(l,q) = Fu(I,q) = Fn(I,q) = 0. 
Let us introduce now the choice function Ca, ( ·) such that
Ca,(X) = {y E )i"i3:r EX s.t.!xG;y}, 
1.e. the function Ca, ( · ) is a pair-dominant on the relation G;. 
Theorem 4 For all I the opera/al' 1-'u( I, 0 )  is such that the collective choice function
C( ·) is constr:ncted .by lhe .following wa.y 
C(X) = n Ca,(X) 
iEl 
On the other hand this operator is equal to 
I'u(l,O) =n F(i,0 ) 
iE/ 
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Proof: can be obtained from the definition of operator Fu(J,p). Q.E.D. 
Consider now the operator LJ F(i, 0). Using the representation of collective choice 
iEl 
function through the functions Ca,(·), one can obtain that 
LJ F(i, O): C(X) =LJ Ca,(X),
iEJ iEl 
i.e. by this operator is implemented the partial (on the set I )  unified-dominant mecha­
nism of choice (see Aizerman and Aleskerov (1990)). 
· 
Let us obtain some other correlations which follow just from the definition of these 
operators 
Fu( {i},p') 
Fn( {i}, q�) 
F(i,pi) ; 
F(i,qi). 
Theorem 5 Fu(J',q) i;;; Fu(/,q) for all I and I's.I. Ii;;; I'. Analogously, Fn(I,q) i;;;
Fn(I', q) for all I ,  I' s.t. Ii;;; I'. 
Proof: We prove only the first statement of the theorem. Let C'(·) and C(-) be a choice 
function generated by operators Fu(J', q) and Fu(J, q). Show that if x E C'(X), then
x E C(X). If x E C'(X ) implies that I u x n v;(x)I :::: q. Then I u x n v;(x)!:::: q
iEl' iE/ 
and x E C(X). Q.E.D. 
8 Range Constraints on Operator F 
As it was defined before, a.ll over the paper that the domain of operator F was assumed 
to be n-tuple product of the set of all weak orders. Because the range of operator F is 
the space C of all choice functions let us define some subclasses of this space which will 
be used as range constraints for opera.tor F. 
Definition 4 Choice function C( ·) is said lo satisfy the condition of 
a) He1·itage (H) if 
b) Concordance (C} if 
c) Independence of outcast
option.s (0) if 
Constancy (K) d} 
YX, X' s.t. X' i;;; X * C(X') 2 C(X) n X'; 
'ef)(',X" * C(X') n C(X") i;;; C(X' U X"); 
YX,X' s.t. 
YX,X' s.t. 
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X' c X \ CIX) * CIX \ X') = C!X):
- \ ' ' ' ' ' ' ' , 
C(X)nX' #- 0 * C(X') = C(X) n X'.
The classes in C isolated with these conditions will be denoted with the same letters 
as the conditions itself. 
Definition 5 The domain D of choice Junctions will be called as closed relative to
relational-functional operator F iffVG F(G) ED holds. The domain D will be called as 
closed according to the class F of operators F if D is closed relative to each F E F. The 
maximal in set-theoretic sense class of operators F according to which th�e domain-D is 
closed will be called as a complete class of operator closedness for the domain D and will 
be denoted as A(D). 
Theorem 6 Operator F(i, q;) generates the choice function C(-) which belongs in general
to the domain H n 0 and only in the case q; = 0 f1mction C(-) which belongs to the 
domain K. 
Proof: The case q; = 0 is obvious. Let us consider the case when q; > 0. Consider an 
arbitrary XE A0, and x E C(X). Let X' C X, x EX'. Show that x E C(X'). Because
of x E C(X) and hence IXnD,(:i:)I::; q;, then IX'nD,(x)I::; q; and x E C(X'). Hence 
the condition H is satisfied. 
Let ns show that the condition 0 is satisfied. Let X be an arbitrary set and C(X) C
X. It implies that if x E C(X) and z rf_ C(X), 1xnv,(x)I:::; q; and IXnD;(z)I > q;.
Then it is obvious that l(X \ {z})nD;(x)I:::; q; and x E C(X \ {z}). Ify rf_ C(X), then
for the same reason l(X \ {z})nD;(y)I > q; and y r/.. C(X \ {z}). We used the outcast 
conclition in its equivalent form (see, e.g. Aizerman and Aleskerov (1990)) .  The theorem 
is proved. Q.E.D. 
Theorem 7 Operator Fu( I, p1) grnfl'atcs a choice functionC( · ) which belongs in general
to the domain H and only in the case 1/ = 0 a function C( · )  belongs to the domain 
ttnc. 
Proof: Consider first the case p1 = 0. In this case according to the definition of operator 
Fu(I, p1) x belongs to C(X) if I U XLJ D;(x)I = 0, i.e. xis undominated option in all
iEl 
G;/X, i E J. 
Let us construct the choice functions C;( · ) s.t. 
C;(X) = {x E Xj"jy EX s.t. yG;x}. 
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It is obvious that because Gi are weak orders, then Ci( · ) E K, and Fu(J, 0) = n C;(-),
iEI 
but intersection of the functions from K is in H n C (see Aizerman and Aleskerov (1990) ).
Now consider general case 0 < pl < m - 1. Let x E C(X), and x E X' C X. This
means that pl 2 I u x nvi(x) 2 I u X' n D;(x)I. Hence x E C(X'), so the H condition
iEl 
is obeyed. Show that condition 0 is not satisfied. Let us consider I = {1, 2}, operator 
Fu(!, 1) and the binary relations G1, G2 shown in Figure 3. For this profile x E C(A);
y, z\l'C(A) because l U AnD;(y)l=I U AnD;(z)l=2. But I U A\{z})nD;(y)l=l 
ieI iEI ieI 
and y belongs to C(X \ { z} ). 
Consider now the C condition. At the same binary relations G1 and G2 and with the 
same operator Fu(J.1) it is obvious that z E C( {x, z}) and z E C( {y, z}) but z \t C(A), 
so the condition C is violated. 
It is obvious that this example can be extended on arbitrary number of options in A 
and arbitrary set I. Q.E.D. 
Theorem 8 Ope1·ator Fn( I, 1/) generates a choice function C ( ·) which belongs in general
to the domain H n 0 and only in the case q1 = 0 a f1mction C ( · ) belongs to the domain
Hncno. 
Proof: Consider first the case 1/ = 0 .  Rewriting the operator Fn(J, l) in the form 
C(X) = {y E X[3J· EX s.t. Vi EI o:G;y} 
we obtain that it is exactly the Pareto rule which generates the functions from the domain 
Hncno. 
Consider now general case 0 < q1 < rn - 1. Let .x E C(X) and x E X' C X.
ql:::: I n x nD;(x) f :::: I n X' nv;(:r)f. hence x E C(X') and condition His obeyed.
iEI iEI 
Consider now two binary relations G1 and G2 shown in Figure 4, and the oper­
ator Fn( {l,2}, 1) .. For. this. situation \Ve .obtain I .n {x,.::}.n:Di(x)f :::: 1 and I n
iel iEl 
{ x, y} n D;( x )[ = 1, so x E C( { x' y} ) n C( { .T • .::} ) . But J' \t C( A) because I n An D;( x) I =
iEI 
2. Hence the condition C is violated.
Consider the condition 0. Suppose x E C(X); y, z \t C(X). This means that 
I n xnD;(x)f:::: ql, I n xnD;(y)f > q1 and I n xnD;(z)f > q1. Let us consider
iEI ieI iel 
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the set X' = X \ {z} and show that x E C(X'). Let on the contrary x f. C (X'), i.e.
I n x'n'Di(x)l > l,so there existz'f.n (Xn'Di(:i:)) andz'En (X'n'Di(x) ) .iEl iEl iEI 
But it implies that there exist i0 s. t. z' \<' 'Di) x) n X, then exclusion from X the
option z does not change the dominance set for"' in X', i .e. z' \<' n (X' nvi(x) ) .  
iEl 
On the other hand if y \<' C(X) and y E C(X') this means that In X'n'D;(y)I:::: q1iEJ 
but I n xnvi(Y)I > q1. Hence z En 'Di(Y)nx, but in this case In xnvi(z)I:::: l
iEJ iE/ iEJ 
and z E C(X) on the contrast to supposition. The theorem is  proved. Q.E.D. 
So, according to the Theorems 6-8 in the Central Region A SM N the class of operators
A(F( i, qi ) )  is a class of operator closedness for the domain H n 0, A(Fu(I, p1) )  is a class
of operator closedness for the domain H and the class A( Fn(I, q1) )  is that one for H n 0. 
9 Special Subclasses of the Class A CR
Consider now special classes for the opera.tors from the Central Region. 
Definition 6 Operator F from the Central Region will be called as
a) q-Pareto for at least one coalition I;
b) q-Pareto for a totality of coalitions;
c) p-Condorcet for at least one coalition I;
d) p-Condorcet for a totality of coalitions iff it is representable in the form: there exist
a totality I (correspondingly. ]) of coalitions I(.!} s. t.
a) F = U Fn(I,q1);!EI 
b) F = n Fn(J,q1);
lEI 
d) F = n Fu(.f,pJ),  respectively. 
JE:J 
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Consider now some particular cases of these operators. In case q = 0, the operator
Fn (I, 0) defines the choice of Pareto-optima.I elements for the coalition I; correspondingly
according to the operator 0-Pareto for at least one coalition I provides that the collective 
choice will consist of Pareto-optimal elements for different coalitions from I. The operator
0-Pareto for a totality of coalitions guarantees that in the collective choice the options 
have to be included which are Pareto-optimal for each coalition from I. If I contains
all non-empty coalitions from N, then the option chosen by such operator can be called
as Edgeworth-optimal option, and if I contains only all single-element coalitions, then
the chosen option can be called as Cournot-optimal one. Finally, if I contains only one
coalition N, then the operators 0-Pareto for at least one coalition and 0-Pareto for a
totality of coalitions coincide and define one operator Fn(N, 0) which chooses Pareto­
optimal elements from X. Let us note tha.t this opera.tor satisfies the following property
Uc Fn(N,O) c V.
Let us study now the opera.tors Fu(!, 0) . According to the definition of this operator 
if we introduce the function 
Ca,(X) = {y E Xl3"' EX s.t. xG;y}, 
then Fu( I. 0) is such that the function C(·) generated by this very operator ca.n be
represented in the form: VX E A" 
C(X) =n Ca,(X), 
iEl 
i .e .  C(·) is a collection of undominated elements (Condorcet winners) for all i from I.
Naturally, such choice function very often will be empty. 
So the operator "0-Condorcet for at least one coalition I" defines the collective choice 
as the options which are undominated for at least one coa.lition I E I. In the case when
I contains only one coalition N. i.e. the set of a.II voters, then this operator chooses the
options which are undominated in all binary relations G;, i .e. the Condorcet winners for 
N. 
10 Operators from Symmetrically-Central Region
Several definitions on the operators from Symmetrically-Central Region are given below. 
Definition 7 The operator F E A CR wiii be calied 
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a) weak k-majority q-Pareto one;
b) strong k-majority q-Pareto one;
c) weak k-majority q-Condorcet one;
d) strong k-majority q-Condo1·cet one iff it is representable in the form
s 
a) F = u Fn(J1, q), where Ile!= k ,  s = c�· is equal to all combinations from n to k ;
f = 1
s 
b) F = n Fn(hq), I cl = k, s = C�;
f=l 
s 
c) F = U Fu(Je,p), IJel = k, s = C,�;
f = 1
s 
d) F = n Fu(Je,p), IJel = k, s = C�, respectively.
f = 1
Let us discuss these opera.tors. In the case a) the chosen option x has to be q­
Pareto-optimal for at least one coalition comprising of k voters; in case b) it has to be 
q-Pareto-optimal for all coalitions of the size k.  
Example 3 Let us show that the reqmst that ,,. is a Pareto-optimal (q-Pareto-optimal) ·
in a strong sense, i.e. "' is chosen according to k-parlial strong q-Pareto rule, is stronger 
that usual Pareto optimality. The profile is given (see Figui·e 5). Then x is Pareto­
optimal for k= n, q = 0. but ii is not Pareto-optimal for any coalition consisting of two 
elements, i .e. for /; = 2 and q = 0.
In the case c) the chosen option .T is p-Condorcet winner for at least one coalition of 
the size k ;  in.the .. Gase-d) i.t is..p-Go11florcet.wi.irne1,.for . ..,.IJ .. @a,li.tiGns-0f.the size k.
Let us consider now special case when the coalitions in the definitions of operators 
strong and weak k-majority q-Pareto and strong and weak k-majority q-Condorcet con­
tain only one element, i .e. 1,, is equal to 1.
In the cases of weak majorities (cases a) and c ) )  these operators coincide and define
the operator which can be ca.lied q-one vote. In the cases b )  and cl) they also coincide
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and if q = 0 then such operator chooses classic Condorcet winner, or Cournot-optimal
element. 
Let us now generalize these operators and introduce two new operators. 
Definition 8 The operator F E A CR will be called as
a) Tp-family of strong k-majority q-Pareto one, and
b) Tc-family of strong k-majority q-Condorcet one iff it is representable in the form
Tp 
a) F =  u
a = l 
Tc 
b) F =  u
a = l
Sa 
n 
e = i 
Sa 
n 
e = i 
Fn(Jf, qa) , I I£ I = kc,, Sa = ( ka ) , andn 
Fu (J�,JP ) .  lfr'I = ko • �o = ( ka ) , respectively. 
n 
Theorem 9 An operator F belongs to the Symmetrically-Central Region iff it is rep­
resentable as on intersection of Tp-family of strong k-majorities q-Pareto operators and 
Tc-family of strong k-maj01·ity q-Condorcet operators, i .e .  
F = n 
{ = 1 
Fn(I;' , q0 )] n [ � � Fu(Jf , p")]
a = l  € = 1 
(4) 
Proof: Let us consider the representation in the form (2 )  for the operator from Central 
Region. The restriction of this representation with Anonymity condition leads to the 
fact that this sets of coalition totalities have to contain the coalitions with different signs 
k1 , • . .  , kT . The form ( 4 )  can be obtained from ( 2 )  because of distributivity of operations 
U and n. Q.E.D.
Let us call this operator for brevity as "T-families of k majorities" . 
1 1  Closedness of the Domairis"iri C 'Relative to Op­
erators from Central and S ymmetrically-Central 
Region 
T·his section begins with the theorem \vhich shows wl1at kind of choice functions is gen­
erated by operators from Central Region. 
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Theorem 10 The Central Region is disposed inside the complete class of operator closed-
ness AH for the domain H, i .e .  ASMN C AH .
· 
Proof: Let us consider the following condition on list-form representation of operators: 
Vx, X, X' : x E X' c X, z E !1(x, X )  =} Z' = z n x' E !1(x, X') (5) 
Q.E.D. 
Lemma 7 Condition (5) is necessary and sufficient one which isolates operators from
AH .
Proof: Let F E  AH· Show that condition ( 4) is satisfied. Suppose not, i .e. :Ix, X, X', Z, Z'
s.t .  z E !1(x , X ) ,  but Z' rt. !1(.T, X') .  But one can construct the profile s .t .  x n v;(x) = 
Z; for all i ,  and X''D;(1·) will be equal to X' n Z;, so if Z' rf. !1(x, X') then x rf. C(X') in
contradiction with assumption that F E  AH. Assume now that condition (5)  is  satisfied.
Then for all X' i t  is obvious that x E C(X') ,  so F E  AH. Lemma is proved.
Because condition ( 5) is satisfied for all X' c;; X, then for the operators which obey to 
neutrality condition 3°, it is obvious that !1 will satisfy to monotonicity condition. This 
implies that AH =:i ASMN. Theorem is completely proved. Q.E.D. 
This result means that all operators from the Central Region generate functions from 
domain H, so we always even restricting the opera.tors from the Central Region can 
obtain function which satisfy to the condition H and probably some other conditions C, 
0, or K .  
The main result of  the paper can be summarized in the following theorem. 
Theorem 1 1  The inte1·sections of Central and Symmetrically-Central Regions with the
complete classes of operator closedness for the domains H, H n 0, H n C , H n C n 0 and
K contain the operators presented in co rrespo nding cells of Table 1 and only them
AH AHnO AHnC AH nCnO AK 
ASMf> federation partial q-Pareto partial Condorcet partial Pareto dictator 
for at least one operator for all operator F( i, 0) 
coalition coalitions 
A � IVJ JV /1  r-famiiies weal k-majoriiy Condorcet operator Pareto operator " VJ 
of k-majorities q-Pareto Fu(N, O) 
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Proof: Let us prove consequently all the statements of Theorem 1 1 .
1 .  The result about the intersection ASNM n AH is direct corollary of Theorems 3, 9,
and 10. 
2 .  The result about A SN MA n AH is direct corollary of Theorem 3.
3. The intersection A SN MA n AHnO contains only operators u Fn(I, q1) .
!EI 
4. Because Fn(I, q1)  E AHnO and as i t  is proved in Aizerman and Aleskerov ( 1 990)
the domain H n 0 is closed relative to U operation, but not n. 
5.  Can be obtained from 3)  with Anonymity restriction. 
6. The intersection ASMN n AHnC contains only operators n Fu( J, 0) because Fu( J, 0)
JEJ 
belongs to AHnC and as it is proved in Aizerman and Aleskerov ( 1 990)  the domain
H n C is closed relative to n operation, but not LJ. 
7. A SM NA n AHnC can be obtained from 5) with Anomity restriction.
s. ASMN n AHnCnO can be obtained from Theorem 8 and the fact that this domain
is closed neither relative to u operation, nor n one. 
9. The result about A SM.VA n AHnCnO can be obtained from 7) under Anonymity
restriction.
10 .  l\SMN n AK.  This result is direct corollary from Theorems 3 and 6. 
1 1 .  Obvious taking into account 9). Theorem is completely proved. Q.E.D. 
The result that l\SMN n AK = { F( i . O ) }  is exactly the analog of famous Arrow's
Possibility theorem. however obtained under the other than Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives Condition. 
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